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The Canadian Law of Consent to Treatment, Second
Edition
Lorne E. Rozovsky
Toronto: Butterworths Canada Ltd., 1997, 161 pp.

Reviewed by Jasmine M. Ghosnt
The Canadian Law of Consent to Treatment is intended for use by
both health care professionals and lawyers. It provides an
understanding of the legal implications that arise when a patient
agrees to receive treatment, and includes several examples of some
of the practical problems that raise consent issues for health
professionals. Rozovsky begins by skillfully incorporating the
elements developed by common law and legislation into a carefully
tailored consent process that fits logically and practically with the
various stages of a treatment relationship. He also provides a careful
analysis of all the criteria legally required for the obtainment of a
valid consent and includes several clinical examples to illustrate how
these elements come to play in the delivery of health care.
Rozovsky identifies several circumstances that require special
considerations or a modification of the law of consent. For example
chapter two discusses situations in which it is either impractical or
impossible to obtain consent from a patient. These include, among
others, medico-legal emergencies and therapeutic privilege. As well,
a discussion in chapters four and five explains the issues related to
mental disability, children and adolescents. In other chapters,
Rozovsky identifies several treatment contexts which raise
controversial consent issues. These include sterilization, abortion,
genetic screening, AIDS testing and tissue donation. chapter seven
covers issues related to the right to refuse treatment, with examples
of recent legislation dealing with health care proxies and advance
directives.
Rozovsky provides many practical suggestions for health
professionals that can easily be incorporated into practice so that
consent problems can be avoided. For example, chapter eight
t B. Sc., LLB. anticipated 1998 (Dalhousie).
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provides guidelines regarding the use of consent forms, telephone
consents, and other useful suggestions. In addition, chapter ten
provides recommendations and case examples on how health
professionals can take a proactive approach to preventing consent
problems. Finally, the appendices provide sample forms and
documents that can be referred to by health professionals and
lawyers who are developing consent forms, living wills, and
Jehovah's Witness alert cards. The book is clearly an excellent
reference for hospital staff and administrators in acute care facilities
who are developing protocols and quality assurance or risk
management measures related to patient consent to treatment.
Throughout the book, Rozovsky identifies legislation and case
law which may apply in circumstances related to consent to
treatment. He also identifies areas where the law is silent. While
Rozovsky does not set out to provide every legislative enactment or
case related to consent law, the book can serve as an original source
for lawyers practising in the area of health law.
One significant flaw of the book is that its focus is geared
towards those issues which are associated primarily with the acute
care institution, and does not provide the same amount of guidance
to health professionals in other settings such as rehabilitation, long
term care and home care. Additionally, Rozovsky begins by
identifying how the issue of consent "brings into conflict the goal of
the health field to care and treat, with the goal of law to uphold the
right of the individual not to be treated" (at vii), but he does not go
into depth to explain what this really means. In avoiding such an
analysis, the book fails to recognize the changing nature of health
care and it assumes that the ultimate "goal of health care" is the
same for all health professionals practising in various settings.
In my view, it is not only important to ask, "what is consent?"
(which is something that Rozovsky does explain and distinguish
from the consent process), but it is also important to ask: "what are
the goals of health care?"; "what is treatment?"; and "how do the
goals of health care and treatment conflict with legal rights of
patients?". The reason it is important to ask these questions is that
the answer to each of them may vary from one profession to the
next, from one health care setting to another, and from one form of
treatment to another. Without going into such an inquiry, the legal
profession may be left believing that all health professionals in all
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health care situations think alike regarding goals of health care. In
addition, it is possible to ignore the fact that the conflicts which
exist between the goals of health care and the legal rights of patients
may vary in different contexts.
For example, the goals of health professionals who have
specialized in rehabilitation may be to maximize individuals'
physical, social and psychological independence. In those situations,
rehabilitation professionals merely act as facilitators as the aim is to
"empower" people with disabilities to take control over their bodies.
Rehabilitation goals can in fact be more consistent with the Charter
ofRights and Freedoms than health care goals in acute care settings.
The rehabilitation goal of maximizing independence requires active
participation and "risk taking" by the patient who must push his or
her limits in the pursuit of independence.
Although Rozovsky does not explicitly define the term
"treatment", he states that it is something that people are
"subjected to" (at viii) as they "submit" to specific diagnostic,
medical or surgical measures (at 1). Sterilizations, abortions,
emergency care, research done on humans, genetic screening, AIDS
testing, the taking of blood samples, etc. are forms of treatment
which involve a patient taking a passive role as the caregiver does
something invasive (i.e. performs a procedure) on his or her body.
The goal of the law of consent is based on that patient's right to
determine what, if anything, is done to his or her body. It must be
noted, however, that "treatment" in a number of circumstances is
not necessarily invasive or detrimental to the bodily integrity or
liberty of individuals.
Treatment may involve teaching patients how to use mobility
aids such as wheelchairs or walkers. In these cases, the rehabilitation
professionals' role is to educate and assist the patient in developing
skill and proficiency in using the mobility aid. Unlike most medical
and surgical treatments which patients "submit" to, the training in
the use of a mobility aid requires active participation on the part of
the patient. In fact, the success of the treatment largely depends on
the motivation of the patient and how much effort the patient puts
into the treatment process. Also, the training in the use of the
mobility aid is not always seen as "invasive treatment" or even
interfering with the patient's right to liberty because the
"treatment" in and of itself can be liberating and almost analogous
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to someone learning how to ride a bike or learning how to ski. Also,
unlike a medical procedure which involves "control" by the
practitioner over the patient's body, rehabilitation measures often
involve the gradual increase of control by the patient over his or her
own body.
In another example, a team of professionals may be required to
do a home visit to assess what needs to be put in place to
accommodate a person's care needs at home. What is being
invaded is the privacy of the patient and his or her family, not the
bodily integrity of the patient.
Rozovsky reminds us that patients have the "right to be free
from bodily interference from others" (at 93) and consent laws are
aimed at dealing with the conflict which arises between the "goal of
health care to treat" and the right of the patient to be free from
interference from others. What Rozovsky does not tell us is that the
conflict between the health goal and a patient's legal rights in the
acute care context may be different from the conflicts which arise
in the rehabilitation or home care context. In addition, the consent
issues which arise may also be different. For example, in
rehabilitation or home care setting, the patient's right to autonomy
and independence can conflict with that same patient's right to
safety. Interestingly both of these rights are protected under section
7 of the Charter which guarantees the right to both "liberty" and
"security".
It is important to keep in mind that litigation in health care has
largely resulted from events that occurred in acute care settings. In
fact, both Reibl v. Hughes 1 and Hopp v. Lepp2 , which are the
leading cases in Canada on the law of consent to treatment,
involved invasive surgical procedures. Courts have had very little, if
any, opportunity to develop the law of consent to treatment outside
of the acute care context. Rozovsky attempts to provide several
examples of situations that occur in health care settings to
demonstrate how consent issues arise for health professionals and to
show how the law may apply. Unfortunately, most, if not all, of
these examples involve events which occur in acute care settings.
Health professionals who practise outside the traditional medical
1

2

66.

[1980] 2 S.C.R. 880, 114 D.L.R. (3d) 1, 33 N.R. 361, 14 C.C.L.T. 1.
[1980] 2 S.C.R. 192, [1980] 4 W.W.R. 645, 112 D.L.R. (3d) 67, 13 C.C.L.T.
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model may require different legal considerations related to the
consent process. It may be that acute care institutions require more
guidance in this area due to the higher frequency of litigation in
that setting; however, with health care delivery moving towards
deinstitutionalization and with patients and families having to
become more and more responsible for their health care needs, it is
possible that new consent issues will arise.

